


Michigan
Journal *of*
International
Affairs

December 2010

ELEPHANTS IN THE ROOM
ADDRESSING UNCOMFORTABLE TOPICS IN WORLD AFFAIRS



LETTER FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Over the past three years, the Michigan Journal of International Affairs has seen tremendous growth. This semester has been no exception. We expanded our membership and readership, hosted more campus speaker events, and received scholarly article submissions from the University community. We have also benefited from increased financial support and resources, including a new partnership with the Center for International and Comparative Studies (CICS). To expand our influence, some of these resources have been allocated to the development of a new MJIA website, which will be launched in early 2011, and the MJIA blog. Through these efforts, the Journal has expanded its role as a forum for discussing important issues in international affairs.

Because of our expanded membership, we consider this edition of the Journal to be the strongest one yet. Our writers have grappled with complex topics for several months, and through a competitive editing and revision process, we have selected the most analytically rigorous pieces for our fall 2010 publication. We hope that these articles will stir debate and inspire greater engagement with these important issues.

We have selected the theme of “Elephants in the Room” because of the increasing necessity of discussing uncomfortable topics in world affairs. From sexual violence in the Congo to the use of depleted uranium munitions in Fallujah, the articles in this edition focus on important issues that do not always sustain sufficient attention. In addition, the Michigan Journal of International Affairs invited University of Michigan Law School Professor Bridgette Carr to speak on the issue of human trafficking. The event, “Modern Day Slaves: The Global Human Trafficking Crisis”, which was open to entire the campus community, sought to raise awareness about this uncomfortable topic.

Our past editions have focused on the global financial crisis, the state of democracy, political upheavals, and challenges to development. In this edition we present analysis on issues that are equally important but, unfortunately, far less frequently discussed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2011

AFRICA

- 1 - Diamonds or Human Rights? — *Justin Schon*
- 2 - A House Divided — *Tyler Jones*
- 3 - Reforms in Equatorial Guinea: A Dictator Tries to Play Nice to Increase Oil Revenue — *Nicholas Moenck*
- 5 - Democracy Only a Step — *Andie Shafer*
- 6 - A Response Imperative: Sexual Violence in the Congo — *Bala Naveen Kakaraparathi*

AMERICAS

- 8 - Post-ethical Politics in Brazil? — *Seth Soderberg*
- 9 - Why the Mexican Drug War is the United States' Burden — *Jake Gatof*
- 11 - Putting the "Eco" into Economics and Ecology — *David Kozminski*

ASIA

- 13 - An Unshakable Destiny? Pursuing Democratic Reform in Hong Kong — *Arthur Ng*
- 15 - Road to Reintegration — *Richard Zukowsky*
- 16 - Shanghai's Second Coming: Political Significance — *Arthur Ng*

EUROPE

- 17 - Will the ECB be Late to the Party Again? — *John Schoettle*
- 19 - Baltic Bitter Wind of Austerity — *Jeremy Armand*
- 20 - Medvedev's 21st Century Economy — *David Kozminski*
- 22 - France's Mainstream Far-Right? — *John Schoettle*
- 24 - Germany: Can We Have Nationalism Back? — *Kevin Mersol-Barg*
- SPECIAL FEATURE: TWO PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION**
- 26 - The Road to EU Accession — *Rohit Vyas*
- 27 - The Changing Face of the Turkey-EU Debate — *Caitlin Miller*

MIDDLE EAST

- 29 - Fallujah: An Exercise in Press Censorship — *Michael McHenry*
- 31 - Can Netanyahu and Israel Have it Both Ways? — *Madeleine Levey-Lambert*
- 32 - On the Brink: Why More Attention Needs to be Paid to the Dangers of Yemen's Faltering Economy and Infrastructure — *Rohit Vyas*
- 33 - The Divisive Threat to the Peace Process — *Madeleine Levey-Lambert*

SCHOLARLY ARTICLE

- 34 - The Influence of Constituency Opinion on Congressional Voting: A Case Study of the Armenian Diaspora and Section 907 — *Nader Delavari*

Diamonds or Human Rights?

— *Justin Schon*

Since the movie *Blood Diamond* was released in 2006, the problem of diamonds financing militant groups and regimes of human rights abusers has emerged as an important part of public discourse. The Kimberley Process (KP) has been the primary international system in place to regulate the sale of diamonds since the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme took effect in 2003. Every year, representatives from its member countries meet to discuss issues in the world diamond market. For two consecutive years, KP representatives have focused on Zimbabwe. The discussions draw upon the old themes of human rights versus diplomatic expediency, illustrating yet again why economic and political interests often make it difficult to uphold human rights.

Zimbabwe has received harsh criticism for alleged human rights violations in the Marange diamond fields. In 2009, Human Rights Watch published a report documenting how the Zimbabwean police and army controlled access to the diamond fields and took over unlicensed diamond mining and trading. The international outcry over these actions led KP members formulate a joint work plan, whereby Zimbabwe committed itself to a phased withdrawal of its armed forces from the mine fields and a monitor to ensure that all diamond shipments from Marange meet KP standards. Satisfaction with Zimbabwe's progress led KP members to agree to allow

Zimbabwe to export two shipments of diamonds.

Human Rights Watch, however, remains unconvinced. According to Rona Peliga, Africa director at Human Rights Watch, “[t]he government



PHOTO COURTESY OF
FATALTRANSACTIONS.ORG

made a lot of promises, but soldiers still control most diamond fields and are involved in illicit mining and smuggling.” Zimbabwe has yet to prevent the “abusive military” from “prey[ing] on the local population.” Moreover, shipments of diamonds should not continue “until there is meaningful progress to end smuggling and abuses by the army.” Without such reforms, blood diamonds will continue to circulate in the international market.

Millions of dollars are at stake in these discussions. The Indian firm Surat Rough Diamond Sourcing India Ltd (SRDSIL) recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Zimbabwe guaranteeing it a supply of 1.2 billion dollars worth of diamonds per

year. The Marange mine is considered the largest diamond mine discovered in the last century. It is 163,100 acres and largely untapped. Within three years, Zimbabwe may be mining 40 million carats of diamonds per year. This quantity is substantially more than the current leader in diamond production, Botswana, which expects to produce about 24 million carats of diamonds this year.

Zimbabwe has accused the West of conspiring to prevent it from benefitting from its diamond resources. Its officials argue that Zimbabwe has upheld its end of the deal in demilitarizing the diamond mines. Obert Moses Mpofu, Zimbabwe's minister of mines and mine development, claimed at the beginning of this year's conference in Jerusalem that a report would be released saying that Zimbabwe should no longer be subject to industry sanctions. Mpofu has also added that Marange “has the potential to raise as much as half of Zimbabwe's budget.”

The counterargument from rights groups and the KP monitoring group is that while Zimbabwe has shown compliance with its agreement at last year's KP conference, its compliance has not been complete or consistent across the board. Parts of Marange have shown marked improvement in the past year, but other areas seem to have remained the same.

The Kimberley Process still needs to improve its handling of human rights issues. Many of its members and partners, such as the NGO Civil Society, share this sentiment. However, it is difficult for the KP to be too strict with regard to human rights. If it takes a hard line on human rights, it runs the risk of losing members and its ability to control and regulate the diamond market. Furthermore, with billions of dollars are at stake in the Marange mines, it seems unlikely that human rights concerns will be taken very seriously. Time will tell if this trend holds true in Zimbabwe.

A House Divided

— *Tyler Jones*

Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, is ground zero in the war between Transitional National Government troops and al-Shabaab, al Qaeda's partner in Somalia. Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Government in 2008, al-Shabaab has successfully taken control of most of Somalia's capital. However, recent speculation of internal conflict between two al-Shabaab leaders has brought the longevity of this movement into question. If history is any indicator though, dissent in this organization may not necessarily bring an end to violence. Rather, it could bring rise to two distinct terror movements.

Al-Shabaab is an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of Islamic courts that rivaled the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 2006. Having controlled a majority of southern Somalia, the ICU lost its foothold in Mogadishu and fled from Governmental and Ethiopian troops. However, hardline Islamists in the group grew disenchanted with the ICU and split to form al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Today, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow "Abu Mansoor" and Sheikh Moktar Ali Zubeyr "Godane" are two of the al-Shabaab's most influential leaders.

But speculation has recently surfaced regarding the relationship between these two brothers in arms. Though details regarding the ideological schism are not clear, some

sources inside of al-Shabaab say Abu Mansoor has pulled his troops (which amount to a quarter of al-Shabaab's military force) from Mogadishu because of disagreements regarding foreign fighters and treatment of aid organizations. Abu Mansoor reportedly objects to the influx of al Qaeda fighters within al-Shabaab. Currently there are six al Qaeda members on the ten-member Shura Council, the governing body of the organization. Additionally, Abu Mansoor disagrees with the expulsion

Why the impending split of al-Shabaab could bring more terror to Somalia.

of international aid organizations, as this strategy only further alienates the Somali people. Though Abu Mansoor denies any internal conflict, unnamed members of the movement tell a very different story.

On the surface, this rift would appear to be the first crack in a wall destined to fall. According to Rashid Abdi, a Somalia expert at the International Crisis Group,

"The group has been resilient, but its longevity is now under serious threat." As seen with Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam following the Soviet invasion, differences in ideological interpretations may lead to a split within the group. However, the common enemy still exists and the fervor to fight remains intact. In bin Laden's case, he went on to form al Qaeda. Such was the case with the Abu Nidal Group (split from Palestinian Liberation Organization), the Palestinian Liberation Front (split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and the splintering of the Red Brigades into two organizations. Even al-Shabaab formed from internal conflicts in the ICU. Terror organizations have a demonstrated ability to withstand internal strife and continue (perhaps under a different name) the fight.

Though al-Shabaab currently faces internal dissent, it is too optimistic to assume the group will collapse. Rather, a division of the organization may act as a catalyst for the inception of a second terror group. To assume otherwise would underestimate Abu Mansoor as a leader and overlook his demonstrated ability to mobilize fighters.

Policymakers should not hope for a split within the organization. With the removal of Abu Mansoor's troops from Mogadishu, the inability of al-Shabaab leadership to work together has already been demonstrated. As long as the organization remains unified, muddled leadership and internal dissent may be the pressure points that Transitional National Government forces need to strike a fatal blow to al-Shabaab.

Reforms in Equatorial Guinea

A Dictator Tries to Play Nice to Increase Oil Revenue

— *Nicholas Moenck*

It would seem that the going rate for a coup in Central Africa is 70 men and some light arms. At least that is all it takes to frighten Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasoga, the president of Equatorial Guinea. In 2008 Simon Mann, a British-Etonian, was arrested at Harare airport in Zimbabwe with 69 men and a plane full of weapons en route to Equatorial Guinea. Though he adamantly denied plotting to topple the regime of Obiang, Mann was extradited to Malabo, the capitol of Equatorial Guinea. Mann was sentenced to 34 years in prison, although after a single year was released. Obiang, in an effort to build up international diplomatic capital, increase oil revenue and foreign aid, appears promoting an image of a benevolent strongman in Africa to overcome his decade's long persona of a brutal dictator.

Equatorial Guinea, a minute country in Central Africa, has been consistently ranked as one of the worst abusers of human rights in the world. Freedom House placed it in the World's Most Repressive Societies category, sharing the distinction with violators like Burma, Chad, Laos, and North Korea. Reporters Without Borders has given Equatorial Guinea's freedom of the press a "Predator" ranking, claiming President Obiang "dominates state media election coverage" and accuses the government of imprisoning numerous journalists.

Global empirical evidence suggests that brutal dictators rarely pay attention




PHOTO COURTESY OF WIKIPEDIA.COM

Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of Equatorial Guinea.

to their low international transparency rankings, but it appears that President Obiang has decided to heed his international image. One major jolt was the United Nations Cultural and Educational Agency's refusal to accept \$300,000 from Obiang to set

up a prize for International Research in the Life Sciences. Sue Williams, a UNESCO spokeswoman in Paris, noted, "There's been a lot of outcry over the prize, a lot of concern expressed by intellectuals, expressed by human rights groups, expressed by journalists,

Nobel laureates, all of whom are very important voices for UNESCO.”

Equatorial Guinea, though, has made inroads in becoming an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Compliant country (EITI). Announced by then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the EITI is designed to ensure that income from natural resources is transparently distributed within the country to limit illegal profits for corrupt politicians. Equatorial Guinea, while imperfect, seems to be making some efforts to remain compliant with the EITI goals.

Simon Mann, the alleged coup plotter, has been named as a new member of the president's inner circle. Many assumed his year in

prison was filled with harsh treatment by governmental guards. However, following his release, Mann returned to London and claimed to have been treated, “[l]ike a guest, not a prisoner” while in prison. It is unclear exactly how Mann was treated while jailed, but what has become apparent is that President Obiang has been able to convince Mann to put a positive spin on his treatment.

The clearest explanation for President Obiang's new efforts to clean up his regime is a desire to increase governmental revenue and his personal longevity in office. Oil and gas exports constitute a significant portion of governmental revenue. Since 1999, the International Monetary Fund has effectively blacklisted Equatorial

Guinea from international finance, hindering its ability to further develop resource extraction. Foreign aid virtually dried up in the 1990s when the abuses and corruption of Obiang's administration became more apparent.

While it is clear that Equatorial Guinea remains a dangerous and fraud-ridden country, recent changes suggest Obiang is making some minor improvements. His reasons appear to be far from philanthropic. Energy revenue and international foreign aid seem like a much better explanation for this sudden interest in improving his international credibility. For Simon Mann's sake, the longer Equatorial Guinea continues on this new streak, the better.

Democracy Only a Step

— *Andie Shafer*

Months after the originally scheduled runoff election of Guinea's first democratically-elected president, voters finally made it to the polls on November 7th. Persistent tension between Guinea's two main ethnic groups, the Peul and the Malinke, is to blame for the many delays. Concern over which group leads the country next – Celou Delein Diallo, a Peul, or Alpha Conde, a Malinke – was the main focus of the country's election. Unfortunately, voters in Guinea showed only a slight eagerness to move towards democracy, largely because of a lack of faith in the government and a fixation on ethnic discord. With violence breaking out in response to the election, Guineans and their new president must work collectively to move past ethnic tensions and emphasize the importance of democracy to economically stimulate one of the poorest countries in the world.

After years of military rule, ethnic conflict and widespread poverty, one might expect citizens to embrace change. More than 40 percent of Guineans live under the poverty line even though the country is a leading exporter in minerals used for producing aluminum as well as gold and diamonds. The voter turnout, however, was not strong enough to send a strong message of desired change to policymakers. In a country of ten million, four million were registered to vote, and only 52.8

percent of those eligible actually voted. That number is worrisome. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, first time democratic parliamentary elections in both India and Zimbabwe yielded voter turnouts more than ten percentage points higher than in Guinea. There are several possible explanations for low turnout. First, voting could have been too inconvenient for those who work long hours or lived far away from polling locations. Another possibility may be that there was insufficient emphasis on the importance of voting. Even more likely, however, is disillusionment with any form of government. After more than fifty years of independence, no government has been able to alleviate ethnic friction or make any significant progress toward economic growth and development.

A fixation on the respected ethnic groups also thwarted an election based on progress. Many voters worried that they would be excluded regardless of which ethnic group assumed power. Because of strong ties to ethnic groups, it is very likely that voters cast ballots for those of their same group, rather than voting based on the candidates' platforms. If this is true, the voters' interest in developing a country rich in natural resources is not as high as outsiders would expect from a country as troubled as Guinea. Voters, however, are not unenthused about a democracy; they are merely frightened

by the prevalence of violence amongst the two groups and concerned about the safety and treatment of members of the group that do not take office.

Indeed, remedying ethnic strife is necessary to move on to issues of critical importance like economic development. These strains on democracy must be solved quickly and collectively by the public to address issues of immediate consequence. The new president must work to represent all voters in order to look at the bigger picture for the future of his economy. He must do so by restoring faith in the government. If he can manage to make any economic progress, perhaps citizens will become more involved in the democratic process in order to elect leaders that best represent them. Emphasizing the importance of voting and electing a leader based on his platform is imperative for the democracy to move forward. But the new president cannot do this himself. Citizens must accept the president's aspiration to unite and eradicate ethnic friction. Only when the president and citizens unite can Guinea start addressing internal turmoil.

A Response Imperative

Sexual Violence in the Congo

— *Bala Naveen Kakaraparthi*

Accounts surfacing from villages in the Democratic Republic of the Congo speak of incomprehensible and unbearable sexual violence. Reports from women in these communities detail increasingly barbaric accounts of systematic mass raping from various rebel groups that enter the towns under the pretense of “providing protection.” The haunting tales document appalling sexual crimes: one 60-year old woman tells of how soldiers around her grandchildren’s age gang-raped her, as well as how her neighbor, an 80-year old woman with a walking stick, too suffered from the monstrosities of the militia groups. Another woman recounts how a band of rebels abducted her and her mother and raped them both, ultimately leaving them for dead. These stories do not simply reveal the horrors happening across the Congo, but they also expose the incompetence of the UN peacekeepers and government security forces based in the region. Until the inadequacies of these forces are addressed, the mass raping and atrocities in the DRC will only continue. Only through increased international assistance from the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, active participation and engagement from MONUSCO (UN forces) and the FARDC (the Congolese national army), and accountability from the national government will a reduction in the massive number of rapes ensuing across the country result.

In Congolese culture, rape is highly stigmatized. Victims of rape are considered contaminated and impure. In many cases, the family members of these victims look upon them with disdain. All too frequently, the husbands reject and leave the women. Raped women, therefore, do not just cope with the pain and humiliation from their traumatic experiences. They have to fend for themselves. Mass rape thus becomes a convenient tool of war that effectively destroys the social fabric.

The perpetrators of these crimes include rebel groups whose objectives range from ethnic hatred, government subversion and entitlement to the lucrative mineral supply found in the Congo. The three largest contributors of these offenses are the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Mai-Mai militia, and Tutsi troops under the command of Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva. These three forces possess superior weaponry and a greater arsenal than that of the poorly-equipped FARDC.

MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, opposes these insurgent powers and combats violence against civilians. Despite being the largest deployed peacekeeping operation in the world, with 20,000 troops from more than 50 countries, MONUSCO has done little to avert the mass raping ensuing across the DRC. Two factors

have caused this fiasco: the negligence of the UN to properly man and supply the peacekeepers and the carelessness of the peacekeepers to actively perform their duties.

Although MONUSCO comprises the largest-manned pacification mission worldwide, its numbers cannot match up to the expectations of the United Nations. The peacekeepers have to manage a population of nearly 70 million in an area three times the size of the state of Texas. With only 20,000 soldiers, MONUSCO has 20 peacekeepers per 70,000 civilians. Margot Wallstrom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, has called Congo “the rape capital of the world,” stating that the peacekeepers feel “stretched” and “demoralized” by the extent of the atrocities transpiring across the region. To curb disillusionment and prevent this issue from ‘engulfing’ the peacekeepers, the UN must immediately send reinforcements. While such a proposition may seem difficult to execute, it’s a proposal that must be fulfilled. As US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared, “We are concerned about the growing gap between multifaceted mission requirements and the resources available to meet them. Too often, despite their ambitious mandates, UN missions lack key capacities.” As Secretary Clinton mentioned, to expect such an undermanned force to counter



These stories do not simply reveal the horrors happening across the Congo, but they also expose the incompetence of the UN peacekeepers and government security forces based in the region.

various belligerent militia groups and maintain peace amongst millions of people seems beyond the capabilities of 20,000 peacekeepers, and this problem needs to be addressed right away. Though the current operation costs around \$1.2 billion annually, the value of human lives destroyed by the unspeakable sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo exceeds any monetary amount.

However, the neglect of the United Nations shouldn't mean that the FARDC and MONUSCO dodge any accountability. On July 10, 2010, rebel forces attacked the town of Luvungi, just 20 miles away from a UN base. For four days, the insurgents gang-raped a reported 242 women (the total number, consisting of unreported cases, could be much higher), and inhibited aid workers from moving into the town to treat the victims. The blame for the

complete lack of response should fall completely upon the FARDC and UN peacekeepers. Though both bodies may lack sufficient personnel and equipment, they nevertheless possess enough troops to at least hamper such incidents. Peacekeepers and FARDC need to march into villages and set up encampments as well as increase the number of patrols across the region. While this expansion might thin out the forces, it provides some degree of defense.

Unfortunately, the monstrosities that transpired at Luvungi only led to a finger-pointing session between the UN and the Congolese government. The UN Security Council condemned the Congo for failing to guard its citizens; the Security Council compounded their reprimands with allegations that the government has lost control of its army, and that the FARDC itself may be engaged

in the same sexual violence as the other rebel groups. Though words of acknowledgement of the gravity of the crisis are vital, this back and forth finger-pointing does not lead to a solution in this nation rife with human rights violations.

Despite this heinous situation, a glimmer of hope remains. The events in the Congo have drawn global attention to the predicament. With greater awareness comes the prospect of greater action. Already, we notice initial responses undertaken. On October 17th, thousands of women took to the streets of Bukavu in eastern Congo and marched against sexual violence; the rally drew worldwide recognition of the women's plight. In addition, around this time, authorities arrested two high-profile rebel leaders, Callixte Mbarushimana of the FDLR and Colonel Mayele of the Mai-Mai militia, under warrants involving mass rape. These responses are just a start; nevertheless, they serve as critical first steps to an arduous process ahead.

Ultimately, the solution is accountability and action. Only through the Congolese state accepting responsibility for their troops and the international community assisting the endeavors of MONUSCO will this conflict have any resolution.

Post-Ethical Politics in Brazil?

— *Seth Soderberg*

Earlier this year, the Brazilian magazine *Cult* wondered aloud about the state of politics in that country: “Could we be living with a post-ethical politics?” The object of their inquiry was the outgoing president, Lula da Silva, and his successor, Dilma Rouseff. The reason for the question was Lula’s incredible poll numbers.

Currently, Lula enjoys an approval rating in excess of 83%. In other words, less than one in every five Brazilians disapproves of the way he is governing their country. These numbers are astounding. After all, Lula is no dictator, and freedom of speech is well-entrenched in the Brazilian constitution; no one should be afraid to dislike him. It would legitimately seem, then, that almost no one dislikes him.

This is true despite a scandal that should have at least tarnished Lula’s popularity. In 2005, a congressional deputy by the name of Roberto Jefferson revealed to Brazil’s leading daily, the *Folha de S. Paulo*, a massive scheme by which the Brazilian Worker’s Party (PT) systematically bought votes at every level of government. The rest of the news media jumped on the scandal and soon gave it a proper nickname: *O Mensalão*, the Big Monthly. Then in July 2009, the brother of the Worker’s Party president was arrested at the airport with \$100,000 in his underwear and luggage. Soon, investigators had connected the head of the post office and a major telecommunication mogul with the scandal. Eventually, over 40 people were

indicted in connection with the scandal. Most of them had direct connections to some element of the PT leadership.

It might be expected that these scandals to reflect poorly on Lula is not based simply on the fact that Lula is a member of the PT. Lula is the head of the PT. In fact, Lula founded the PT, and had run for president on a PT ticket every four years from 1988 until his reelection in 2006. But even though Lula had a hand in nearly every activity of the PT, the Big Monthly scandal never quite caught up to him. It did, however, force the resignation of Lula’s chief of staff. His replacement: longtime PT operative Dilma Rouseff. In an election held in the wake of the scandal, Lula beat his nearest opponent by eight percent in the first round.

It is important to remember that it is not as though other parties are free from corruption. The deputies whose votes were being purchased came from several different parties. The biggest scandal of 2009 broke when investigators filmed the president of the chamber of deputies in the Federal District – the Brazilian equivalent of Washington, DC -- pulling several thousand reais out of his socks to pay off a man who turned out to be an investigator. The chamber president was the centrist Democratic Party, which controls some seats in the National Congress, but has a relatively small following at the state level. Unfortunately for Lula’s principal rivals, the Social Democratic Party, the Democrats are the second-largest members of the

opposition coalition.

In the wake of these scandals, and the overwhelming popularity of Rouseff, Lula’s chosen successor, it is less surprising that *Revista Cult* was questioning whether Brazil was experiencing an era of politics in which ethics do not matter. Voters, it seemed, did not care about the dishonesty and the corruption of the PT, when it had produced startling economic results. It is commonly argued in political science that real GDP growth is the only thing that matters when it comes time for an election. Brazil this year seemed a textbook example of the importance of that metric. Since 2005, Brazil has seen its GDP double, as moribund state enterprises have been privatized and new aid programs have expanded the lower class’s share of national wealth.

But scandal struck again in the summer of 2010. After Rouseff left the office of Chief of Staff to campaign for the presidency, her successor and longtime subordinate was forced to resign after magazines revealed that she and her sons were trading influence for money. For a time, Rouseff fell below her opponent in the polls. Then, she recovered. While perhaps she may not be as slippery as Lula, it is possible to see her electoral recovery as a sign that post-ethical politics were at work.

Yet, in the end, the general elections provided proof that Brazilian voters do care about ethics. Rouseff had the most votes in the first round, but to the surprise of many, the Green party candidate, Marina Silva, whose campaign was little more than platitudes about cooperation and, importantly, constant denunciation of government corruption, won 19% of the vote. With no chance of actually winning, these votes can be seen as protest votes, cast to ensure that Rouseff would not win a majority in the first round. In the Federal District, the site of every recent corruption scandal, Silva won. Brazilian voters care quite a bit about ethics. They only lack honest alternatives.

Why the Mexican Drug War is the United States' Burden

— *Jake Gatof*

The relationship between Mexico and the United States has historically been frustratingly complex. The Mexican-American War in 1846 and US involvement in the 1910 revolution intertwined the histories of these two nations. Now, relations between the two countries are often perceived to be tied to immigration and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Unfortunately, these two issues have so dominated the conversation that they have overwhelmed the public's perception of US-Mexican Relations, distracting from the horrific nature of the Mexican Drug War.

The focus on Mexican-US



Marijuana and cocaine are the Mexican blood diamonds, and the United States stands culpable.

immigration law and NAFTA-specific policy makes sense in a somewhat cynical way. Policymakers and the public alike both prefer to conjure national and moral urgencies when there are issues they would prefer to remain unaddressed. The virulent immigration debate is aimed at building more than just a

physical wall at the border. This debate has created a smoke screen around Mexican-American relations, occluding Americans' moral obligation to take personal responsibility and to assist Mexico from a position of solidarity.

The United States must first assist our neighbors in need through diplomatic means, and resort to military use only when absolutely required. The US must respond in a cooperative manner, especially when we stand as the root of the problem. To do this, it is further essential that Americans grasp the difficulty of the choices presented by many of the cartels to Mexican government and city officials. It becomes surprisingly easy to turn a blind eye to the drug trade if the alternative leaves your family dead. American policies must therefore appreciate and address the complex cycle of corruption and violence.

The initial question of why the US must act at all is simple: the Mexican drug war would not be in existence without the United States' drug consumption. American



PHOTO COURTESY OF FRONTPAGEMAG.COM

consumption of cocaine and marijuana has fueled the cartels' unyielding desire to supply. Marijuana and cocaine are the Mexican blood diamonds, and the United States stands culpable.

Yet President Obama's only response has been to continue the Merida plan, which originated under the Bush administration, and includes \$1.3 billion of military-to-military aid over three years.. Against his own words of using diplomacy first, Obama has simply extended the use of military action.

A lackadaisical increase in special operations military training and spending will minimally quell the problem, but the failures of such an intervention are already clear. The death total has steadily risen—averaging about a thousand total

deaths per month. A recent New York Times article declared that many northern cities in Mexico are in state of perpetual anarchy. While the US cannot be exclusively to blame for this slow decline into chaos, it is clear that US military spending is not working.

As many US foreign officials and media personnel alike have commented, the state of Mexican politics and law should be the target of an overhaul in order to combat this drug war. The legalization of illegal drugs has been one proposed intervention. In Ciudad Juarez, a recent city ordinance has done exactly that. While the success of such a policy has been limited, it has already done more than any previous military actions in the violence-ridden city.

When Obama took power, he

called for drastic changes in US foreign policy. He vowed to stray from the Bush policies of immediate military responses to foreign crises. In the case of Mexico, these promises remain empty. Ending violence in Mexico is vital for North American trade and stability. American citizens want a safe neighbor, and Mexican citizens want a safe home. The macroeconomic and geopolitical implications of an unstable Mexico are terrifying. Americans must find a way to bring stability to the regions most affected by the Drug War in order to polish the image of US-Latin American cooperation, for their economies and histories are unbreakably linked. It is for this reason that the United States cannot continue the failed military interventions of the past.

Putting the “Eco” into Economics and Ecology

— *David Kozminski*

A 2002 Central American Commission on Environment and Development report outlines the immense biodiversity that exists in Central American countries. Some of the most amazing creatures highlighted in the document are large predatory cats like the panthers, pumas, and leopards that play important roles in balancing extremely fragile ecosystems. For the past twelve years, these animals have made their homes in a wildlife reserve that spans over a dozen countries called the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC). The MBC has made massive strides in the protection of endangered species, including the predatory cats, and has also served as an example to other wildlife reserves around the world on how to support a vibrant community of flora and fauna. With all its environmental successes, one might assume that the Corridor is beyond reproach. In reality, however, there is ample evidence that it hinders economic growth, making it detrimental to regional prosperity.

The MBC is a multinational ecological initiative that is supported internationally by many organizations worldwide, including the World Bank. It is both a geographic region and a cooperative community of nations—Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama—that seeks to protect all manner of



This vast “corridor” of environmental preservation allows wildlife to move from place to place and survive in a world that is increasingly overrun by industrialization.

wildlife in the species-dynamic rainforests and mountain regions across the continent. One of the most important aspects of the MBC is that 600 smaller land clusters are physically connected in a way that is conducive to animal migration. This vast “corridor” of environmental preservation allows wildlife to move from place to place and survive in a world that is increasingly overrun by industrialization. Without the physical connection that corridors provide, most species cannot successfully migrate without facing the threats that arise from human interaction. Since the late 1990s, the MBC has been successful in minimizing harmful human interaction with fragile ecosystems and endangered species.

While the MBC has been very successful at preserving Central American wildlife, it has severely

limited the spread of economically stimulating industries in the region and has negatively affected the agricultural industries surrounding the Corridor. Because of the stringent restrictions on where new buildings can be built, businesses and corporations that would have moved into Central America to take advantage of the cheap labor force have been largely dissuaded over the past decade. Countries like Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico, whose economies depend heavily on these manufacturing and production industries, have seen immense declines in economic expansion in the past twelve years. Furthermore, the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor’s paramount achievement—the physical connection of vast amounts of Central American land to promote animal migration and successful reproduction—is designed in a

way that is inhibitive of agriculture development or interaction. This is especially harmful to the Central American countries that rely heavily on agricultural exports for economic stability.

Supporters of the MBC tend to dismiss the argument that the wildlife preserve has hurt Central America's economies. They cite the successful preservation of biodiversity as a driving force for tourism, especially to places like Costa Rica and Belize. Ecotourism to Central America has exploded over the past decade due to the widespread commitment to ecological preservation in the region. But the optimists should not dismiss too readily the real challenges faced by the economies of these countries, with or without ecotourism, especially amidst a global economic crisis. Workable solutions have to be discussed in order to continue to preserve the rainforest wildlife as well as the economic interests of these nations. Otherwise, a disillusioned working class will not show the same level of support for the MBC that they have in the past. In fact, the MBC's popularity in the region has already begun to wane. Agricultural co-ops and organizations around Central America have petitioned for greater access to lands currently protected under the Corridor. Nonetheless, the MBC has been largely unwilling to grant these requests, which has led to public agitation and the spread of illegal farming and hunting in forest regions.

The MBC has to make some concessions with these communities or it will face extinction. The people of the participant countries have been patient, but patience is not a renewable resource. Clear solutions are available to the current stalemate between farmers, hunters, and conservationists. The administrators in charge of the Biological Corridor should seriously consider them. For



PHOTO COURTESY OF ECOWORLD.COM

example, crop rotation, where farmers change their farm locations from year to year, would mitigate incursions into the corridor itself while still providing these farmers with optimal land. Other economically friendly conservation policies would also be welcome. Granting eco-friendly farmers, hunters, and construction crews special benefits would provide the monetary incentives for these workers to respect the MBC without sacrificing economic prosperity. In short, the people that live near the MBC can have the necessary protection of wildlife while still enjoying the fruits of a prosperous economy. Just as the MBC protects

the large jungle cats found within its borders, so too must it work to protect the fragile economies of its participant nations.

“An Unshakable Destiny”?

Pursuing Democratic Reform in Hong Kong

— *Arthur Ng*

In 1997, millions watched as the Union Jack was slowly but inexorably lowered, and the flag of the People’s Republic of China raised in its stead. It was all part of the ceremony for the “Handover,” when Britain returned Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty after 150 years of colonial rule. “Now Hong Kong people are to run Hong Kong,” said Governor Chris Patten in his farewell speech. “That is the promise. And that is the unshakable destiny.” He was referring in part to the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s constitutional document, under which China had agreed to allow Hong Kong to have a measure of autonomy, and to continue with its political and capitalist system for 50 years, with minimal interference from China. The Basic Law also includes clauses that indicate an eventual implementation of direct elections for both the Legislative Council, Hong Kong’s legislature, and the Chief Executive through universal suffrage.

So far, Beijing has more or less kept its end of the agreement - the proportion of directly elected seats in Legislative Council (LegCo) is greater than in the colonial era. In June earlier this year, a package was passed that would reform LegCo and the committee responsible for electing the Chief Executive for the 2012 elections. The reform package was hotly debated in the media and among the various political parties,



Preventing the passage of a bill through the Hong Kong legislature, however, is a far cry from democratic reform.

centering around those who wanted a guarantee of full direct elections by the end of the decade, and those who supported the package as a small step towards democratization, even if there were only tentative, ambiguous remarks from Beijing about possible full direct elections in the future. In an effort to pressure Beijing, some elected LegCo members had stepped down and stood for re-election as a de facto referendum for direct elections by the end of the decade. While demonstrations are necessary for making public opinion heard, negotiations are ultimately the sole method for communicating directly and creating a cooperative relations with Beijing.

Although the reform package adds only ten directly elected seats, from a historical point of view, the increase would not be unreasonable. Since 1991, when such seats were first instigated, progress has been slow, adding a few more seats per election. Hence it may be logical to assume that a full democracy would not be

achieved in one masterstroke, but rather through a methodical increase in representation.

The main problem for the democracy movement is figuring out how best to bargain with Beijing. Hong Kong has a history of successful influence over policy through organized, peaceful protest. In 2003, more than 500,000 people demonstrated against a proposed “anti-subversion” bill, eventually leading to its withdrawal a few months later in September. With this bill, the Hong Kong government would have been able to outlaw groups considered “subversive” to the Chinese regime, essentially cracking down on dissent, and thereby negating the rights to free speech and of assembly, which are protected by the Basic Law. The incident illustrated the ability of the public to influence policy, and revealed public resolve, along with some measure of responsiveness from the Hong Kong government to public opinion.

Preventing the passage of a bill

through the Hong Kong legislature, however, is a far cry from democratic reform. Direct communication with Beijing is undoubtedly necessary for greater, constitutional changes. This is where the 2010 package may have made significant progress. As political scientist Ma Ngok points out, for the first time, direct negotiations occurred between Hong Kong and Chinese officials, leading to a compromise. Beijing had ruled in 2007 that only half of the seats in LegCo could be directly elected, but decided to concede 40 out of 70 seats for direct election in the 2012 elections. Some

measure of trust must have developed through the successful compromise from both sides for this year's reform package, which could lead to a greater willingness to work with the democracy movement in the future.

Ultimately, Hong Kong's democratization cannot occur without approval from Beijing and setting the precedent for direct negotiations is only the first step in what looks to be a long road ahead. The pro-democracy camp needs to recognize the value in both protest and negotiation. Dissent alone makes it too easy for the Chinese leadership

to label the movement as "subversive" to the regime. Furthermore, there is still a great deal of uncertainty with regards to Beijing's definition of "direct elections." What Beijing sees as reasonable elections may not be the clean and fair elections the pro-democracy movement envisions. Such issues cannot be resolved without negotiation, which may play a key role in soothing Beijing fears over perceived "subversion" as well as become a channel for persuasion through reason and rational argument.

Road to Reintegration

— *Richard Zukowsky*

As the United States prepares for its declining role in military operations starting in July 2011, it has become clear that the US and its allies are running out of time in Afghanistan. Running out of time for results-based progress in combat operations, running out of time to stabilize a sustainable democracy, and running out of time to implement the much-discussed Taliban reconciliation project. Getting the reconciliation project up and running could go a long way in making a sustainable Afghan democracy a reality.

Politicians and generals across the NATO coalition have come out in strong support for the reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan society, politics, and the military. In the US, the top diplomatic and military representatives in the region agree on the program's importance. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the President's Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, considers the program crucial for American success in the country. The top American commander in the country, David Petraeus, agrees on the potential of the program to cement some form of success in a country in great need of it. Politicians from Senator Richard Lugar from Virginia to Prime Minister Cameron of the UK to Afghan President Hamid Karzai have all repeatedly expressed their high opinion of the program.

Numerous obstacles to reintegration, though, continue to hamper progress. First, the program is woefully underfunded. In March 2010, the program was promised \$250 million dollars. To date, only about \$200,000 has been spent on reintegration projects. EU nations, Japan,

and the US have yet to fulfill their pledges. The result of the funding shortage has been a complete lack of organization in the enactment of new procedures. In addition, the Afghan government does not have coherent administrative and strategic plans in place to deal with Taliban deserters. Local officials have been forced to create impromptu resettlement programs for those Taliban fighters who have turned themselves in. Ambassador Holbrooke, highlighting either the ineptitude or unwillingness of the Afghan government, explained in a recent interview with ABC News that the reconciliation programs "were not yet operational because the government of Afghanistan has not yet gotten it up and running."

Were it not for the other high profile difficulties that the NATO coalition is facing in Afghanistan (i.e. the battle for Kandahar province), the failure of reintegration would be seen as a major blemish on US policy in the region. Critics continue to wonder how something deemed so important to Afghan and American interests can continue to be left by the wayside. Any flow of soldiers from the approximately 25,000-strong Taliban force to the struggling Afghan National Army would be welcome. Reintegration, though not necessarily a primary means, could be a boon for the augmentation of Afghan forces.

Enlarging the army, however, is not the only benefit of such a program. The Karzai government is not strong enough to control all the outlying elements of his nation. As the war drags on, it is becoming increasingly apparent that any solu-

tion to the conflict will have to include an agreement with the Taliban. Reintegration policies are legitimate stepping stones in such a process. General Petraeus is certain that "this is how you end these kind of insurgencies," and points out that the same strategy worked for the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland. There appears to be a tacit understanding among higher circles that a complete US withdrawal is contingent upon brokering a deal with the Taliban. Petraeus understands that the NATO coalition cannot "kill or capture [its] way out of an industrial-strength insurgency." The commander certainly will be important to this program going forward, as he has \$100 million in emergency funds at his disposal to help jump-start the project.

There has been recent criticism regarding President Karzai's creation of the High Peace Council to work out a solution to the problems. Detractors point to the council's composition of ex-Taliban figures and warlords and wonder how peace is to be attained. Such critics need to realize that this could be the future of Afghanistan. Although human rights activists may express their concern, it must be recognized that peace may have to come at a price. If the reintegration programs can get off the ground and running, that price may be cooperation with some less-than-reputable popular figures. The Afghan state is not yet strong enough to begin worrying about its moral positioning. Karzai himself has simply stated that reintegrated Taliban members must accept the Afghan constitution and renounce Al-Qaeda.

Despite the recent struggles to implement and sustain a legitimate reconciliation program, General Petraeus is optimistic. He places a great deal of emphasis that in the past month numerous high-level Taliban leaders have reached out to senior Afghan government officials. "We're on the cusp of beginning, of supporting, the Afghan beginning of reintegration," says Petraeus. For the sake of Afghanistan's sustainability as a nation, one must hope the commander's hopefulness is not misplaced.

Shanghai's Second Coming

Political Significance

— *Arthur Ng*

Neon lights. Streets busy with cars and people. Movie theaters. Late 19th and early 20th century Shanghai was the treaty-port par excellence, a hub of commerce and entrepreneurship, boasting the biggest foreign presence in China. The years from then until the 1950s had not been kind to the city; the business elite fled due to the Chinese Civil War and subsequent communist victory. Yet in the recent decade, Shanghai seems to have regained its former eminence as China's primary financial center. In 2007, it drew in 25% of China's overall foreign direct investment. Its GDP overtook that of Hong Kong in 2009, reaching \$218.3 billion as opposed to Hong Kong's \$210.7 billion. Many people have questioned whether this will result in political liberalization for the country as a whole.

The China scholar Marie-Claire Bergère, predicted in 2002 that Shanghai would assume the role of a mediator of sorts between raw "modernity" and the rest of China. Events seemed to have proven her correct, though increasingly the city is becoming much like it had been a century earlier: it is turning into an island of prosperity along the coastline. It has become a microcosm of China's prosperity gap between rural and urban residents, with a large number of migrant workers from the countryside working low-paying jobs, while some of the wealthiest elites maintain lifestyles reminiscent of

colonial privilege. Ultimately, Shanghai's fortunes are firmly tied to the rest of China, and its role as a political leader is limited.

Although the number of foreigners in Shanghai is reminiscent of the early 1900s, the nature of the presence is quite different. In the foreign concessions of the late 19th and early 20th century, extraterritoriality was granted to the foreign powers in control, and even the Chinese Imperial Court's jurisdiction over Chinese subjects was severely limited within the boundaries of these areas. Therefore, several prominent political dissidents were able to take refuge in Shanghai and continue to publish their views, contributing heavily to the revolutions that later occurred. The Chinese Communist Party itself was officially founded in 1921 in the Shanghai French Concession. In 2010, foreign firms are encouraged to invest in China. The Chinese government provides attractive tax incentives for foreign investors, but the privilege is purely economic, not political. Shanghai receives the bulk of foreign direct investment, owing in part to its geographic position midway between north and south, and the extensive river system which connects the city to major areas in the heartland. Hence the city no longer acts as a safe haven for political thought that may cause the Chinese leadership to feel threatened.

Shanghai's revival is also partly

due to the will of the Chinese leadership in developing the city in the 1990s. During the 1980s, Shanghai was largely neglected in the economic reform agenda, with the focus more towards the south. After the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, the wave of protests along with clamor for democratization in Hong Kong led the central government to look for other areas to develop economically, areas which were less politically volatile than the Canton region. They rather naturally settled on Shanghai, given the geographic and historic significance of the port. However, the fact remains that the city's rise was strongly influenced by the Chinese leaders, and indeed was chosen in order for them to retain more political control over economically developing areas. Since then, the city has boomed, leading to the rise of a wealthy elite, with much greater freedom to consume foreign movies, music and other forms of entertainment. That in itself makes Shanghai an exemplary model of the Chinese strategy of political stability through raising standards of living. The Chinese government realizes that the easiest way to keep people happy is to allow them to get rich.

The new Shanghainese are drawing from both the past and present for a sense of culture and identity. Furthermore, social, economic, and political factors are not completely isolated from each other, and are inevitably linked to some extent. The rich influx of foreign goods and culture, the relatively new-found prosperity of the Shanghai people, and the development of an identity would certainly lead to increasing political awareness. Still, 21st century Shanghai no longer has the same opportunity for dissent that it did in the late 19th and early 20th century. In this light, the role of political pioneer will most likely remain with the Chinese leadership instead of the educated Shanghainese.

Will the ECB be Late to the Party Again?

—*John Schoettle*

The euro/dollar exchange rate has become a microcosm for the increasing divergent economic views of held by many in Europe from the rest of the world. While Japan and the United States have moved to make their industries more competitive by allowing their currency to depreciate, members of the European Central Bank (along with almost every government in Europe) have moved the opposite way. Granted, some of the more fiscally troubled countries of the European Union, such as Greece and Ireland, are exercising much needed prudence through austerity measures meant to prevent a credit crisis. But on the other side of the picture, governments in strong fiscal shape, such as Germany, have taken to the Hooverite mentality of “tightening the belt” in face of an economic crisis. Recently, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner lamented Germany instituting its own austerity program to save about \$95 billion through 2014 at the fall IMF meeting.

This is all coming as fears of a possible re-emergence of recession gain prominence in Europe where unemployment was at 10.1% as recently as late September. The problem could be further exacerbated by governments slashing wages and jobs, further pressuring European consumers. In the midst of recovery, it has become more and more precarious to pull the rug out on the recovery. German Central Bank



Europe, led by inflation hawks like Weber, appears to be moving in the wrong way again.

Governor Axel Weber has foolishly pushed the European Central Bank (ECB) to withdraw from buying government bonds, a policy enacted during the troughs of European debt crisis over the summer. Europe, led by inflation hawks like Weber, appears to be moving in the wrong direction again. This is highlighted by the ECB’s recent decision to not engage in quantitative easing while the rest of its counterparts have remained vigilant in warding off deflation. While it may seem admirable given a history of hyperinflation in some European states, deflation is currently a much bigger problem especially since central banks worldwide have already cut interest rates to zero with little to show for their efforts.

With Japanese, American, and possibly British central banks poised to bring a second round of quantitative easing into practice amid worldwide fears of a double dip, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has repeatedly shied away from commenting on the ECB’s possible response. Many wonder if this is just another case of the ECB dragging its feet. As the

financial system was about to implode in the summer of 2008, the ECB was still raising interest rates. Much to German Bank Governor Axel Weber’s dismay, it was not until May 7th, 2009 that the ECB finally began its first program of quantitative easing, almost six months after the Federal Reserve first implemented similar policies. Yet even quantitative easing, the method by which central banks buy up financial assets after lowering interest rates to zero, has largely been deemed a failure. The method is criticized for having the central bank monetize its own country’s debt and the prospect that it may fuel inflation. Indeed, faced with interest rates already at zero and not able to fall any further, central banks have resorted to Plan B.

Meanwhile, critics point out that as the ECB fiddles, the euro has had an unprecedented run against the dollar, hitting a six month record high (gaining 17% from its June low) against the dollar on October 12th. Under pressure from the Germans, the Bank’s waffling makes European producers less and less competitive

in the world market, thereby putting Europe's recovery chances further in doubt. Ironically enough, it was the devaluation of the euro resulting from the credit crisis that helped Europe out of its sovereign debt crisis for the time being. The entire Eurozone grew at a 1% quarter-over-quarter basis in the second quarter of 2010 compared to a meager .3% in the first quarter. This number may not seem impressive, but it also takes into account austerity programs put in place by Greece and other fiscally dubious members affectionately known as the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) whose economies all experienced negative growth. Germany benefited immensely from the devaluation especially given its large export industries. Its 2.2% growth rate in the second quarter

was the highest since reunification in 1990.

Trichet and Weber have been misguidedly praised for not engaging in what many are calling a nascent "currency war" kicked off by Japan's quantitative easing, the United States' aggressive stance against the currency manipulations of the Chinese, and the US Federal Reserve's efforts to push yields even lower. This praise ignores the important economic principle that currency devaluation is a potent medicine for low economic growth. A cheaper currency can make a countries export's cheaper and imports more expensive nearly overnight. With a recovery on such shaky footing, the ECB needs to step in for governments (such as Greece and Spain) who cannot provide their economies with the necessary stimuli.

Having strong, vibrant economies in the south is the only way that the daring experiment of the European Monetary Union will survive. In the short run, austerity may reign and appease the bond vigilantes in Europe, but with its rapidly aging population, a cumbersome welfare system, and rapid influx of immigrants, Europe's only viable option in the long run will be to grow its way out of these problems. The E.C.B's response to global attempts to stimulate the economy may tell a lot about what Europe's future holds. Now, the important question is whether Trichet and his colleagues will engage in a second round of quantitative easing, or whether the ECB will, once again, be late to the party.

Baltic Bitter Wind of Austerity

— *Jeremy Armand*

The worldwide Great Recession of 2007-2010 has beaten down most wildly on the Baltic states. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia suffered the biggest GDP falls from the peak level of the crisis in the fourth quarter of 2007, ranging from 26% for Latvia to 18% for Lithuania. According to the last International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts, the three Baltic states' GDPs in 2015 still wouldn't have reached their level of 2008. The three nations, seen as Baltic Tiger economies until the beginning of the recessions, are now suffering the brunt of popped credit bubbles caused by heady lending and spending. Inescapably, this unprecedented economic carries along with it enormous social costs for the population of these three states. The unemployment has jumped in 2010 to rates ranging from 17.5% for Estonia to 19.8% for Latvia, compared to five percent just two years prior.

Far from adopting expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and other contra-cyclical measures to support demand, the Baltic governments have deliberately tried to aggravate the depression of their economies. Since they joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, the three countries expect to adopt the euro in the next few years. To prepare for this adoption, they have to bear the pain of any country whose currency is pegged to the euro, which keeps it from regaining competitiveness through devaluations. Thus the Baltic states

are constrained to make an 'internal devaluation', meaning pushing down prices and wages in order to remain competitive. Furthermore, to join the Eurozone, the Baltics have to maintain their public deficit below three percent while facing rising deficits simultaneously. As a consequence, the governments have no choice but to drastically shrink wages, raise taxes, and cut public spending. Another constraint comes from international bond markets that threaten Baltic states with lending terminations if they don't show they could impose drastic austerity measures. Finally, in the case of Latvia, which is in the worst situation of the Baltics, the government succeeded in the fall of 2008 to secure a \$10 billion bail-out from the IMF and the EU only with strict austerity conditions.

Both economically and socially, the cost of this policy is heavy and painful. In the Baltics, retired people, who have seen their pensions trimmed by the governments, swell the ranks of the poor. Many people swarm around soup kitchens. Indiscriminate cuts in social spending threaten to close many hospitals or schools, and undermine the action of social services and local administration. Suicide numbers have increased sharply. And because of austerity measures, long-term unemployment has remained stubbornly high. Furthermore, these harsh policies often lack any economic sense. Austerity in time of recession

tends to depress activity and thus inhibit any fast upturn in economy. This can lead to a vicious cycle of deepening unemployment, rising social welfare spending, and larger public deficits.

However, Estonia will finally get the green light to join the Eurozone on January 1st, 2011. Thanks to its drastic austerity policies, the country will finally meet European requirements for public finance, with a public deficit of only 1.7% in 2009. The adoption of the European common currency will probably increase investor confidence in the country and give Estonia lower borrowing costs.

Some economic specialists even cite Estonia's thrifty public finance policies as a positive example, even if compared to its two Baltic neighbors, the country actually accumulated assets before the crisis. But Estonians, and Baltic people in general, who face painful austerity policies and the troubling Greek case inside the Eurozone, now appear much more reluctant to adopt the common currency. Like Greece, the countries have become aware that Eurozone deficit limits would impair their capacity to address social programs.

Today, the Baltic nations' population is deeply disillusioned. The drastic austerity measures have led to demonstrations and violent protests that shook Latvia and Lithuania in 2009, leading the Latvian Prime minister to resign in late February 2009. A year later during the October 2010 Latvian legislative elections, voters re-elected the ruling coalition, but the pro-Russian party, Harmony Center, made some significant gains. This serves as proof that the Baltic states' population lost confidence in the ability of EU membership to bring wealth and prosperity.

Medvedev's 21st Century Economy

— *David Kozminski*

Throughout the 20th century, the Soviet economy was infamously dependent on the export of oil, natural gas, and other forms of energy. While it may not seem immediately obvious, today's Russia is working to shed that image. Russia still relies heavily on industries of energy export, but a recent aggressive effort by the Russian government under Dmitry Medvedev's administration to both globalize and diversify economic sectors makes it less vulnerable to misfortune.

The economic fortune of the Soviet Union, throughout the 20th century, was empirically tied to the health of its oil and natural gas industries. From 1910 to 1950, global output of oil dramatically increased, largely due to the USSR, where oil production increased four-fold. As world oil consumption grew throughout the 1900s, so did the Soviet economy. During the 1970s, a plethora of Arab conflicts increased oil demand in the USSR, which supplied the Soviet Union with a predictable economic boom. The fortunes of the Soviet Union correlated directly with global oil demand.

While reliance on oil and natural gas exports were the driving force behind much economic growth in the 20th century, being too reliant on these energy industries made the Soviet economy vulnerable to the whims of the global market. When, in 1986, oil prices plummeted by over 60 percent, the oil profits the USSR had enjoyed for decades became essentially nonexistent.



The 1990s saw the culmination of decades of global pressure on post-Soviet Russia to diversify a largely unilateral, languid economy.

The imminent end to Soviet global economic power had arrived. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian people were left with a supremely inefficient economy, outdated industrial capital, and a general lack of direction. Furthermore, there was simply a lack of will to create a dynamic economy. The 1990s saw the culmination of decades of global pressure on post-Soviet Russia to diversify a largely unilateral, languid economy into one that could support multiple industry types in order to achieve long-term stability and growth. While this process was painstakingly slow, today's Russia has achieved some semblance of greater global economic interaction as well as a growing diversity in economic sectors, due in large part to aggressive action taken by President Medvedev.

Russia, under Medvedev's encouragement, has continued to expand its economic dealings with countries outside its original sphere of influence. Today, the Russian Federation expends much of its time courting the growing Chinese economy

into energy agreements. In his article "Why Moscow Should Beware Beijing," Owen Matthews quips, "Russia's burgeoning friendship with China is a neat match of the world's biggest energy producer and its biggest energy consumer." There is more at play than a growing Chinese demand for Russian oil, though. The two states—both operating government-controlled economies—share a fate controlled by their respective governments. For the moment, the Russian government under Medvedev and the Chinese government under President Hu Jintao appear to be content in a growing economic interdependence. This also explains the recent \$13 billion Skovorodino–Daqing oil pipeline, built by Russia's Transneft and the China National Petroleum Corporation—both state-owned mega corporations. The pipeline, opened in October by the partner governments, is just the first in a series of oil and gas lines planned between Siberia and China. In a March of 2008 New York Times article following the Medvedev's electoral victory, historian Stephen



PHOTO COURTESY OF WASHINGTONPOST.COM

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

Kotkin predicted that the incoming administration would continue to support increased global interaction. Today, massive energy agreements with China, South Korea, and other international players suggest that Kotkin was correct in his assessment. The current Russian government is certainly more concerned with economic globalization and global cooperation than its Soviet predecessor.

Yet the Russian economy has not only globalized its energy dealings, but diversified into new, dynamic sectors, as well. While hydrocarbon production and distribution is still the chief workhorse in the Russian economy, new industries signal a changing market structure in Medvedev's Russia, away from the unilateral dependence on energy output in Soviet times. One example of a growing alternative to energy

production is the telecommunications industry, in which Russia is now a large global provider. Through recent global mergers, Russian corporations like VimpelCom have acquired other, smaller telecommunications companies across Europe, Africa, and Asia. The telecommunications industry represents one of Russia's fastest growing, most lucrative sectors, and, most importantly, this new dynamic industry is not reliant on the export of oil. With a proposed merger with Sawiri (which includes a stake in Egypt's Orascom and the Italian Wind), VimpelCom is poised to become the fifth largest mobile phone carrier by amount of customers. VimpelCom's growth is indicative of a larger trend in Russian society—the proliferation of non-energy-sector corporations that were absent immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In a 2008 speech on economic

strategy, Medvedev addressed the shape that Russia's economy would take in years to come. He outlined that Russia's workforce would have to be more effective by increasing its global interaction and improving underdeveloped sectors of the economy. Hinting strongly at the prospect of Russia falling behind other competitive economies, he remarked that "this situation is all the more dangerous when global competition is increasing." President Medvedev is aware that it will take sustained efforts to diversify and globalize the Russian economy in order to continue growth. This attitude is in stark contrast to the one present during the Soviet era. Clearly, Russia, though still relying heavily on oil and energy exports, has matured into a more sector-diverse, globalized economy, and Medvedev's efforts to spur this change should not go unnoticed.

France's Mainstream Far-Right?

—*John Schoettle*

“Misunderstood.” That was the one word Marine Le Pen, daughter of the famous far right leader in France Jean-Marie Le Pen, used to describe the National Front party in France. As the 82 year old Jean-Marie Le Pen prepares to give up his position as President of the party, a party conference will choose his successor from just a list of two at the beginning of 2011. The two candidates are his longtime right-hand man, Bruno Gollnisch, and Marine Le Pen, the youngest of his three children. With all indications pointed to a win for Marine (Jean-Marie has already made it known he thinks she will and should win), the question arises how the new National Front will look after losing its founder.

Ms. Le Pen is taking over a party well-known for its nationalist and anti-immigration far right stance. While her father led the party, he was often reprimanded for his anti-Semitic and xenophobic views. Even though Marine Le Pen very much espouses the anti-immigration and nationalistic outlook of the National Front, she has rejected her father's anti-Semitic views and has promoted more inclusiveness of homosexuals and feminists. In January 2005, Marine was outspoken in condemning attacks on Jews by North Africans in her Jerusalem Report.

If Marine wins out, she will pull the National Front more into the mainstream and out of the five to

Marine plays to the silent majority in France without having the stigma of promoting Jewish conspiracy theories and other anti-Semitic rhetoric.

twelve percent vote doldrums of electoral support that have characterized its existence. By taking a stand against Islam and immigrants, Le Pen plays to the silent majority in France without having the stigma of promoting Jewish conspiracy theories and other anti-Semitic rhetoric. This has been a smart move for her politically. Increasingly, Ms. Le Pen has become increasingly popular throughout the country. Tall, blonde, tanned, and articulate, she also presents much better in French media. She has assumed leadership of party communication, serving currently as its Communications Chair, to spread a party image that appears much more harmless to the general French electorate.

These characteristics have already allowed Le Pen to be very effective in challenging the status quo. She is getting quoted almost daily in the national press and has become more aggressive in her attacks on French President Nicolas Sarkozy. After the

disappointing French World Cup team came home last summer, she gained notoriety for claiming that the French National Team did not represent her, propelling an even more racially loaded reaction throughout the country. What may be most concerning is the popularity she has achieved in opposition to President Sarkozy, who is up for re-election in 2012 and obtained the lowest popularity of his term in October with 29 percent of responders indicating satisfaction with his job.

It is a testament to the Le Pen's increasing power that Sarkozy has moved to the right after initially attempting to build a centrist government upon his election in 2007. Stricken by violent protests against pension reform, Sarkozy has attempted to regain popularity, most prominently in the recent reshuffling of his cabinet. He showed many of the centrist and independent ministers appointed in 2007 the door and ushered in new ministers like Alain



PHOTO COURTESY OF WIKIPEDIA.COM

Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Gollnisch, 1st of May 2010 National Front's rally in honor of Joan of Arc, Paris.

Juppé, the new right wing Defense Minister and former Prime Minister under Jacques Chirac. Also, he is showing an increasing toughness on immigration through his support for the recent controversial law expelling Roma and the national Burqa ban. Yet despite the popularity of the measures, Sarkozy's popularity has not been recovering. Additionally, he has faced difficulty responding to Marine Le Pen amid the general nationalistic sentiments taking place across Europe. It is not so easy to brush off the younger and less controversial Le Pen as her father.

With the stage set for Marine to become a prominent contender for the 2012 presidency, France finds itself vulnerable more than any other European country to the rise of nationalism. The country is already well-known for the strict defense of its culture through the Culture Ministry, assigned to eliminate any

non-French words from the nation's vocabulary. Even in 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen surprised many in advancing to the run-off against former President Chirac despite a disappointing showing in 2007 caused by Sarkozy's move to the right. Now, with immigration and Islam's role within society at the forefront of voters' minds, even her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, would have been a formidable opponent. In addition, the youthful Marine Le Pen and her softer and less menacing stances have propelled the National Front from a party of protest to a potential party of government. It is not impossible now for her to somehow leap over Sarkozy and advance into the second round of the upcoming French elections against a candidate of the left. This would be a great achievement because if she makes it to the second round, Ms. Le Pen would not be facing a right candidate like her father in 2002 but

a candidate from the left whom she may gain more votes against. This is plausible because Ms. Le Pen is doing very well in public opinion polls, frequently placing in a tight third among voters' choice for President behind Sarkozy and prospective Socialist Candidate Dominique Strauss-Kahn in a fragmented race.

It is a long shot, but if Marine Le Pen is able convince the French electorate that the National Front is indeed "misunderstood" and is, in fact, mainstream, then the 2012 election may serve as the turning point for nationalist far-right causes in France. This would then set a precedent for other European states, whether she makes it to the run-off or not.

Germany

Can We Have Nationalism Back?

— *Kevin Mersol-Barg*

In recent decades, the average German citizen would probably openly identify as a European before he or she professed to his or her German identity. This tendency is likely to soon come to a grinding halt. The reason: Germany has had to foot the bill for the financial crises in other European states. In addition, Germany has had to grapple with growing domestic discontent over foreign relations with foreign states and immigrants alike. Germans couple this increasing hostility toward foreigners with a growing sense of national pride. From a strong manufacturing industry to its leadership in many international bodies, Germans have much to be proud of. As Germans mix their resentment and pride, they concoct a seemingly toxic mixture, as foreign critics often see it, in which Germans reconnect with a far-right agenda.

Within the past year, many political parties, in Germany and elsewhere, have found their way to political prominence on the platform of immigration reform and financial austerity—objectives that many Germans warmly receive—although critics admonish Germany for looking inward, even as many other European states do the same. Although the German electorate has historically avoided far-right parties since World War II, this may change as Germans reconcile their history with current affairs and embrace a far-right platform that embarks on a pacifist,

self-absorbed avenue rather than the well-trodden path of bellicose far-right politics. As German nationalism resurges, neighbors of Germany have cause to worry if they recall the two world wars that Germany spearheaded in the last century.

Amidst the rubble of German defeat at the hands of the Allies in World War II, the international community had resolved to facilitate a rebirth of Germany that condemned far-right politics. At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the leaders of the Allied forces convened to construct post-war Germany; they partitioned Germany in order to ensure that Germans could not reunify in the name of blind nationalistic fervor. Even twenty years after East and West Germany reunified, the physical split in territory within Germany has led to a greater emphasis on regional government in an attempt to decentralize power. Acutely aware of the danger that strong German nationalism would pose to the world, Germany worked further to intertwine its identity and fate with that of the European community. In 1951, Germany established the European Coal and Steel Community with five other European states, including France, on the premise that economic interdependence between countries would usher in an era of peace; to that end, the European Union, the successor to the Community, recently celebrated sixty years of peace between

member states.

In recent decades, Germany has peacefully established itself as the mainstay of the European economy, and until China overtook it in 2009, Germany exported more than any other country in the world according to the World Trade Organization. As Germany underwent tremendous economic growth, its European neighbors increasingly expected it to pledge more of its resources to European unity. Beyond cofounding the supranational government of Europe, the European Union, Germany exchanged its strong currency, the Deutschmark, for the euro—the currency of the European economic union called the Eurozone—as a means to stabilize the regional economy and reaffirm its commitment to regional prosperity. While Germany reaps the social benefits of selflessly helping its neighbors, it has also sown the seeds for German discontent; lately, these seeds have yielded a crop of states that disobey the rules and expect a deeply resentful Germany to ensure financial stability in Europe. In the past year alone, Germany has begrudgingly bailed out Greece and provided a financial safety net for other foundering economies, such as Ireland and Portugal. European states depend on Germany, the fifth largest economy in the world according to the International Monetary Fund, to financially anchor Europe.

In an era in which German



PHOTO COURTESY OF WIKIPEDIA.COM

Thilo Sarrazin, a former member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

politicians comfortably tailor domestic policy to the reality of today rather than that of the years following World War II, negative sentiments regarding immigrants in Germany are taking root. While the government takes a fairly neutral stance on immigration, as exemplified by its policy to grant work permits to migrant workers from Turkey, the public discourse within Germany focuses most heavily on the identities of immigrants Turkish immigrants, significantly contribute to the estimated population of 3.5 million Muslims in Germany as of 2009, amounting to a bit more than 4% of the German population. As the presence of Muslim immigrants has sent tremors throughout a fairly homogenous German society, the resulting discourse over the “issue” of Turkish citizens taking up permanent residence in Germany has fueled the rise of hateful, ignorant literature that

advocates a return to eugenics. In such a book that has shot up the list of bestselling German books, author Thilo Sarrazin argues that Muslim immigrants reduce the intellectual integrity of German society and are genetically inferior. Sarrazin and others that share similar sentiments are shifting the public discourse in Germany toward an agenda that endorses far-right policies. Even the influential Spiegel magazine has featured Sarrazin on the September publication, adding that his book “is unconvincing, but it has managed to convince many people.”

In light of recent advancements toward further integration within the European Union, Germans have dug in their feet and clearly demarcated the extent to which they will allow the European Union to challenge their power and identity. This line serves as an abrupt wake-up call for all those

that predicted an ever more dormant, selfless Germany. On the domestic front, Germany seems destined to adopt far-right policies in the form of self-absorbed, xenophobic policies. Nationalism has taken up root yet again, and German officials will have to mollify their European neighbors as they navigate through political waters toward nationalist shores from which they can still anchor the European Union. On this shore of glistening sand, Germans may just wake up and find they are first and foremost German.

The Road to EU Accession

— *Rohit Vyas*

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a content man. His party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was catapulted into single-party rule in 2002 on a platform of democratic reform and market liberalization. His government has stabilized the Turkish economy, and has shown a strong commitment to raising democratic standards.

All of these measures contribute to one of Turkey's major goals: accession to the European Union (EU). The EU accession negotiations aim to direct Turkish policies towards more "European" standards of democracy and trade. Accordingly, Turkey has responded by working to increase foreign-direct investment, decrease inflation, and to pay off its debts to the IMF, all while achieving an average GDP growth rate of 7.6% during Erdoğan's tenure as Prime Minister.

Despite this progress, significant problems remain. Specifically, the AKP needs to abandon policies that discriminate against the Kurdish minority. It also needs to make more progress on relations with the Republic of Cyprus. These policies are nationalist relics from the Atatürk era, and require updating for the goals of modern Turkey.

The Kurds are Turkey's largest ethnic minority, comprising about 20% of its population. However,

they are not recognized as an official minority, and as a result have often pushed back against the Turkish government. For 25 years, the Turkish armed forces have been fighting insurgents of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which has only incited more nationalist sentiment against the Kurds. Unfortunately, the Turkish government presumes all Kurdish protests to be organized by the PKK. As a result, hundreds of children from the southeastern region of Turkey have been jailed for supporting terrorist activities. Continuing these discriminatory policies will hurt the chances of Turkish entry into the EU.

Dealing with this issue will be no small task. Erdoğan and the AKP will have to contend with opposition from nationalists, many of whom equate recognition of the Kurds as a threat to Turkey's integrity. The right-wing Nationalist Movement Party, which opposes EU accession and Kurdish rights, gained roughly 13 percent of seats in the most recent parliamentary elections and will make bypassing nationalist opposition difficult. In addition, attacks by PKK militants on Turkish troops have made it more difficult to secure a resolution.

To its credit, the Turkish government has addressed some issues. For example, the recently launched "Kurdish Initiative" aims to

extend cultural and lingual rights to the Kurdish minority. In addition, the Turkish constitution was amended in order to lift the ban on the Kurdish language. These are steps in the right direction, but more concrete action needs to be taken.

The Turkish government also has yet to yield any real progress in the Cyprus dispute. In 1974, Turkish forces occupied a portion of the island in order to prevent the annexation of the island to Greece. As a result, the island was split into two halves: the Republic of Cyprus (now a member of the EU), and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey. What has resulted is a rather thorny trade issue: the EU insists that the Turkish government must open up trade with the Republic of Cyprus in order to join the EU. However, Turkey refuses to do so.

Again, Turkey has attempted to improve its stance on this issue, but these attempts have been half-hearted at best. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots did back the Annan Plan for Cyprus, which aimed to reunify the island, but this fell through. Turkish policymakers have also failed to come across with a consistent, coherent message on this issue. For example, Cemil Cicek, the Turkish deputy Prime Minister, recently stated that if Turkey were to be forced to

choose between supporting either EU membership or the Turkish Cypriots, “[then] Turkey’s choice will forever be to stand next to the Turkish Cypriots. Everybody should understand this.” As this statement shows, the first step to solving this issue is to form a coherent policy. Again, a similar problem emerges: will Erdoğan and the AKP take bolder policy initiatives, or will they opt for the safer route?

The Turkish government needs to address these issues; without doing so,

the chances of Turkish entry in the EU are slim. The European Commission has even said as much: “[Turkey should] develop a comprehensive approach to reducing regional disparities, and in particular to improving the situation in southeast Turkey, with a view to enhancing economic opportunities and social and cultural recognition for all Turkish citizens, including those of Kurdish origin.” The Cyprus dispute is another matter entirely – it is a test of Turkey’s commitment to the EU,

and its ability to reform its nationalist policies. If it continues to support the Turkish Cypriots so adamantly, EU accession will remain dream. Erdoğan now faces a choice: support the continuation of nationalist policies that were put into place by the republic’s founding father, Atatürk, or commit itself to further integration into the world economic system. His choice will weigh heavily on the outcome of Turkish-EU accession talks.

The Changing Face of the EU-Turkey Debate

— *Caitlin Miller*

Turkey has actively attempted to join the European community since 1957. Turkey’s EU bid predates the establishment of the euro, the creation of the twelve-star flag, and the very title of European Union. Since World War II, Europe has worked tirelessly to not only promote European integration, but also to create a strong European community. In this effort to unite the continent into a cohesive unit, however, several countries have been left feeling marginalized – none more so than Turkey, which has battled the European Union to recognize its legitimacy and accept it as a member for decades. Although Turkish accession has received staunch opposition from several European countries for a number of years, it seems that the tide of the debate is turning.

France, who previously had blocked four of the 35 chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, the list of

accession requirements for Turkey to join the EU, said last month that it is willing to reopen talks on three of the chapters if Turkey can make the necessary reforms. This is a huge step from just three years ago, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated “I do not believe that Turkey belongs to Europe, and for a simple reason: because it is in Asia Minor. What I wish to offer Turkey is a true partnership with Europe, but not integration into Europe.”

Continuing discriminatory policies that are, quite literally, relics from another era, will only worsen the chances of Turkish entry into the EU.

It can be argued that the conflict between Turkey and the European Union pre-dates the formation of both country and confederation. Years of warfare with and separation from the Ottoman Empire have created a link in the Western mind between Turkey and the “barbaric” East. This image of Turks as “others” has not been aided by modern stereotypes linking the East and, more specifically, Islam, with terrorism and violence. Many argue that these unfair connections,

coupled with Turkey's location in Asia minor, naturally exclude it from joining the European Union; they argue that Turkey is, in many ways, not "European." None are more vocal in this sentiment than France's political figureheads – past and present – as former French president Giscard d'Estaing made abundantly clear when he stated that "[Turkey has] a different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life. It is not a European country... [Turkish integration into the European Union would mean] the end of Europe."

Turkey's potential accession to the West's most dominant political club has once again made potent the issue of "defining" Europe under a conceptual umbrella, leading many to argue that the EU refuses to accept Turkey because, as the current Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated, the EU is a "Christian club." But to generalize this conflict as purely cultural is to overlook many of the crucial issues that are coming between Turkey and accession. In order to accede to the EU Turkey must negotiate all of the EU's 35 *acquis communautaire* provisions. Further, due to its ongoing political and economic problems, including Turkey's refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships, the EU Council has blocked eight of the 35 chapters, bringing accession talks to a near standstill. Additionally, European Commission President Jose-Manuel Barroso has urged Turkey to

improve freedom of speech, rights of women, trade unions, and treatment of minorities. It is clear that if Turkey cannot overcome its issues with Cyprus, its Kurdish population, and its struggling economy, it may never achieve its dream of joining EU ranks. Despite these issues, Turkey has, over the past seventy years, proven its worth as a Western ally. While the majority of Turks are Muslims, the country has a secular democratic system with a pro-Western foreign policy. These orientations could prove highly useful: Turkey would become a bulwark of democracy in the Middle East as well as a critical ally in the fight against terrorism. Turkey has been an ally of the West in the past, both as the long-standing Eastern flank of NATO and as a Western ally during the Cold War and the recent war on Iraq. As former senior advisor to the United States Department of State David Phillips explains: "Turkey's accession is an unprecedented chance for both the country to fulfill its potential as a successful modern democracy in the Muslim world and for the West to strengthen a precious ally in the fight against terrorism [while fostering] liberalization in the Islamic world."

A tremendous step forward was signaled by the recent September passage of Turkey's constitutional referendum, where 58% of voters approved 26 amendments that bring the country one step further to the EU's demands. The amendments

include articles that would allow collective bargaining for the public sector and affirmative action measures for women. This is a major step forward for the country and indicates its willingness to comply with the European Union's democratic and social values.

For these reasons, it is critical that France upholds its word and joins Europe in aiding Turkish accession to the European Union. It is likely true that Turkey is not yet ready for EU membership: many reforms must still be made before it is ready to accede to the EU and become an official part of the West. It is critical, however, both politically and culturally, that France be an ally of change and reform, not marginalization and exclusion. Although it is home to the largest Muslim population in the EU, France's anti-Muslim sentiment has been a problem in years past, sparking several riots within the past five years. By rejecting Turkey, France sends a message to its Muslim population that no matter the changes they make, no matter how integrated into European society they become they will never truly be a place for them in the European world. With the accession of Turkey, France has a chance not only to help reform a modern democracy and foster an ally in the Middle East, but also improve its relationship with its immigrant population.

Fallujah

An Exercise in Press Censorship

— *Michael McHenry*

Less than a year after George W. Bush gave his infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech in May 2003, US and British military forces launched one of the most violent campaigns of the Iraq War in their attack on the city of Fallujah. The campaign, lasting from April to December 2004, consisted of some of the most brazen violations of international humanitarian law the conflict had seen.

In their “liberation” of Fallujah, US forces took to aerial bombing of residential and industrial areas, preventing the wounded from reaching the hospital by bombing the bridge connecting it to the city, and killing large numbers of civilians with snipers and refusing medical aid for injured and dying non combatants. Most of the blame for these atrocities can be placed squarely on the shoulders of the White House and high command of the Pentagon who approved and commanded policies such as shooting on sight and indiscriminate bombing, not to mention blocked peaceful negotiations that could have prevented the assault from ever occurring. A telling example of the rules of engagement, or lack thereof, in the assault on Fallujah is an incident involving 30 civilians attempting to escape the city. US F-16 fighter jets monitoring the situation from thousands of feet above were immediately instructed to “Take them out” by the commanding officer. While the number of civilians killed by American and British forces is debated,

mainly due to the explicit prevention of any outside groups from collecting any evidence, it is wide accepted that it numbers in the thousands.

While these crimes, along with the countless others that remain unmentioned, were appalling, they are now in the past. They live on only in the memories of family members and friends of the victims. However, there is another crime that has continued to affect the people of Fallujah in a devastating way. According to a recent peer-reviewed study published in the *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, there have been dramatic increases in infant mortality, leukemia, and cancer rates reported in Fallujah after the US assault that surpasses those found in post-war Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The team of 11 researchers came to Fallujah to investigate anecdotal reports of abnormally high rates of cancer and congenital birth defects. Due to a lack of population-based epidemiological data, the team used a questionnaire survey method often used in resource-poor regions. The data gathered from 711 households confirmed the initial reports far beyond what the researchers expected. The child mortality rate was found to be at 80 per 1000 births—an astronomical figure in comparison with other similar countries. In Jordan the child mortality rate is 17 per 1000 births and Kuwait it is 9.7 per 1000. Not only were the birth defects

confirmed, but also a dramatic shift in sex-ratio from a typical 1050:1000 male to female to about 850:1000 in newborns was found to have begun in the year following the assault. This shift is considered to be indicative of the genetic damage that tends to target males and is similar to findings in Hiroshima.

The study also found a 38-fold increase in leukemia, a ten-fold increase in female breast cancer and substantial increases in lymphoma and brain tumors in adults from the pre-2004 levels. In Hiroshima, the increase in leukemia was 17-fold. The types of cancer found were also found to be highly similar to those seen in the Hiroshima survivors who were exposed to ionizing radiation following the detonation of the atomic bomb. The authors conclude that the identity of the agent causing these sicknesses is still unknown, but the evidence points to depleted uranium being a strong possibility.

According to a 2002 decision by the UN Sub-Commission on Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, the laws breached by the use of depleted uranium munitions include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Charter of the United Nations; the Genocide Convention; the Convention Against Torture; the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980; and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. International law is clear in forbidding the use of ‘poison or poisoned weapons’ and ‘arms, projectiles or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering’. Not only were they previously declared illegal, depleted uranium munitions are categorically considered “weapons of mass destruction.” Depleted uranium munitions are not mainly a weapon used against the “enemy,” but civilians. Their main effects on people and the environment are not felt immediately on the battlefield but rather destroy

future lives over a period of many years.

Perhaps the most unsurprising aspect of this story is that it went virtually unreported in any mainstream US media outlets. As with the massive civilian casualties incurred upon

Fallujah five years previously and the use of depleted uranium shells and their subsequent effects during the 1991 Gulf War, it is just not customary to report on such things in the mainstream American press. The ancient Greek historian, Thucydides,

gave a succinct and accurate estimation of the application of international law in the 21st century in his maxim, “The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.”

Can Netanyahu and Israel Have it Both Ways?

— *Madeleine Levey-Lambert*

In mid-October, the Israeli cabinet approved an amendment to Israel's Law of Citizenship which will require all non-Jewish immigrants to declare their loyalty to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The oath does not apply to Jews, who have an expedited path to Israeli citizenship. To become law, the bill must pass three Knesset votes in the coming months. Presented as a pre-condition to a possible extension of the settlement freeze, the law has generated critical opprobrium from many who believe it to be a reinforcement of the inferior status of Palestinians living in Israel.

Ahmad Tibi, an Arab member of the Israeli parliament, believes that the new loyalty oath is a "punch in the gut" to the 2.5 million Palestinians who have been fighting for equal rights in Israel for over 60 years. "The oath," he says, contains an "embedded recognition [of] a Palestinian concession over the right of return." Tibi's views have been echoed throughout the country by Arabs and Jews alike. Five members from the left-wing Labor party, as well as three members from Netanyahu's own Likud party, have rejected the proposal. Social Affairs Minister, Isaac Herzog, described the bill as containing a "whiff of fascism." In late October, a protest was held in Tel Aviv that attracted thousands.

Israeli Ambassador to the US,

Michael Oren wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed that "[Palestinian] affirmation of Israel's Jewishness is the very foundation of peace. Just as Israel recognizes the existence of a Palestinian people with an inalienable right to self-determination in its homeland, so, too, must the Palestinians accede to the Jewish people's 3,000-year connection to our homeland and our right to sovereignty there. This mutual acceptance is essential if both peoples are to live side by side in two states in genuine and lasting peace."

It is likely that if the law comes into effect, there will be another freeze on Israeli settlement building in the West Bank. It seems as if Netanyahu is throwing a bone to Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, whose far-right Yisrael Beiteinu party made the oath the focal point of its election campaign in 2009. Netanyahu fears that any concession to the Palestinians will cause the far right-wing of his coalition to walk out. By placating Lieberman, an influential politician who is staunchly opposed to an extension of the settlement freeze, Netanyahu appears to be saying that he plans to accept Obama's generous offer of military hardware and security guarantees in exchange for a one-time 60-day extension to the settlement freeze, a move that Lieberman is sure to condemn.

The issue of the loyalty oath invites the ever-popular question of whether Israel can truly be Jewish and democratic. By exempting anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews from pledging to a state in which they do not believe, the oath is explicitly discriminatory. This belief is echoed by Tibi when he asks "If Israel is the Jewish state, then what right do we Palestinian interlopers have to be here at all? None." The recent oath is only one of many laws that discriminate against the Palestinians and confirms their inferior status in Israel. Other bills are currently being discussed in the Knesset. Among them include the denial of public funds to those who mark Israel's independence day as a day of mourning and the ability to arrest those who deny Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. As a minority, Palestinians are systematically excluded from important aspects of Israeli life. Many Palestinian neighborhoods are not linked to power or sewage grids, and the absence of clear borders is apparent in the citizenship which is given to Jewish settlers (but not to Palestinians) who live outside of the Green Line. This asymmetrical treatment of Jews and Arabs in Israel, is echoed in the reality of the loyalty oath, which demonstrates that Israel is a democracy but often only for its Jewish citizens. This renders it, in the eyes of many, no democracy at all.

Perhaps it is possible for Israel to truly be a Jewish and democratic state. To be such, however, means that it must provide full and equal rights to all of those who live within its borders. A loyalty oath that precludes this possibility should be left out of the equation.

On the Brink

The Dangers of Yemen's Faltering Economy and Infrastructure

— Rohit Vyas

Ten years ago, images of a bombed USS Cole filled US airwaves. The attack, which took place off of the coast of Yemen, was the work of the forerunners to the group now known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Since then, the situation in Yemen has been steadily deteriorating. As one of the poorest Arab nations, with approximately 35 percent unemployment, Yemen has been reeling from a crippled oil-dependent economy. This has been further exacerbated by a worsening security situation – Yemen's government has been cooperating with the US to root out AQAP activity, but the Yemeni army has become strained from fighting Shi'ite rebels in the north. These issues allow extremist organizations like the AQAP to exploit public discontent to their advantage. Yemen is a strategically important country to the US in the War on Terror. To combat AQAP extremism, the West must be willing to make more long-term investments in Yemen's infrastructure and institutions, as opposed to short-term investments in military aid.

Today, Yemen stands on the brink of economic collapse. It runs a deficit that is more than 25 percent of the GDP. The public recognizes how dismal the economic situation is – in a recent Gallup poll, 59 percent of Yemenis believe that the economic situation in their country will worsen. After Palestine, this is the highest level of discontent in the region. Confidence in the government is at a record low as well. In North Yemen, three out of ten people have confidence in the government's ability to deal with the poor, and even fewer people express

support in the South – approximately eleven percent. Such discontent among the general population will increase the amount of pro-extremist sentiments, and make it easier for groups such as the AQAP to gain more support. The effects have already begun to show– the government is dealing with a secessionist movement in the south, and ethnic tensions with Shi'ite rebels in the north.

Yemen is also dealing with another looming economic crisis—an economy that is largely dependent on crude oil exports. In fact, oil production accounts for 75 percent of government income and 85 percent of exports. This, along with the World Bank's projections that Yemen's oil reserves will be depleted by 2017, is very concerning. That Yemen has been unable to diversify its economy points to an underlying problem that many Yemenis now recognize. Yemen


is not in an environment that encourages investment opportunities. Perhaps as a direct consequence of its poverty, Yemen does not compare well with its neighbors in terms of transportation infrastructure and communications networks. For example, Yemen has 45,000 miles of roads, only 3,900 miles of which are paved. More investment and financial aid is needed in this area for further development of Yemen's economy. The US currently provides \$200 million in aid to Yemen – a small amount given Yemen's strategic importance to the US. In comparison, Pakistan, another front in the war on extremism, receives billions of dollars in humanitarian and developmental aid.

The US and other Western countries must be willing to make these long-term investments. Without them, it will be difficult to truly curb the influence of organizations like the AQAP. Yemen's Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi, has stated that “a security or military solution alone is not sufficient” in dealing with the problems of terrorism. More attention needs to be paid to Yemen's economic and infrastructural needs. So far, the West has voiced support for similar proposals. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will actually follow through with those policies.

Yemenis' Confidence in Institutions

% Yes, confident

■ North ■ South



Feb. 24-March 19, 2009

GRAPH COURTESY OF GALLUP.COM

A Divisive Threat to the Peace Process

— *Madeleine Levey-Lambert*

The most recent round of direct peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians are on fragile ground only weeks after they started. The talks, which began on September 2nd and have been held in Washington and Egypt, marked the first time in 20 months that the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority agreed to meet to discuss a “final status settlement” by creating a two-state solution. The focus of the talks has been the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, as demonstrated by Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas’s statement to the UN General Assembly on September 25th that Israel “must choose between peace and the continuation of the settlements.” Comprehensive peace between the Israelis and Palestinians is not solely contingent upon a permanent settlement freeze, however. If the settlement issue were to be resolved today, there would still be another, if not more, critical obstacle: the current rupture in the Palestinian leadership between Fatah and Hamas stands in the way of creating a comprehensive Palestinian platform that is a true representation of its people. Only a unified Palestinian leadership can properly address Israeli security concerns and force Israel to agree to concessions on the determination of borders.

Hamas and Fatah each maintain their own vision of an ideal Palestinian future. Yet, only the Palestinian Authority, governed by Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah party, has been included in the peace talks. Hamas, the Islamist group that controls Gaza, has been left in the cold.

The two groups have been passionately at odds, especially since Hamas’s violent takeover of Fatah security forces in 2007. Hamas has stipulated that talks be based on a Palestinian “consensus,” implying that it wants to be present at the negotiating table. Israel will not negotiate with Hamas, however, until it agrees to end all violence, accept all agreements previously accepted by the PA, and recognize Israel. Israel fears that a nascent Palestinian state may fall into the hands of Hamas. As a result of these security concerns, Israel is hesitant to freeze construction in settlements in the West Bank. The inability to include both sides of the Palestinian leadership in the negotiations raises the important question of whether a peace agreement will represent the beliefs of the Palestinian people, and, whether such an agreement can be upheld.

Yet, an increasing number of Middle East experts are arguing that Hamas must be present at the negotiating table. Alon Ben-Meir, the Middle East Project Director at the World Policy Institute, believes that although talks can begin between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, success cannot be sustained unless Hamas is involved. Hamas is not a child that will realize the error of its ways simply because it is given the silent treatment. Hamas cannot be coerced into adopting a peaceful attitude by excluding it from the direct negotiations. Rather, Arab states should urge Hamas to renounce violence and to accept the Arab Peace Initiative. The Initiative aims to end the conflict by calling for a complete Israeli

withdrawal from the occupied territories and a fair solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel’s stipulation that Hamas recognize the state of Israel is unrealistic and should be reconsidered; Israel does not need Hamas’s recognition. Including Hamas in the talks may lead to Palestinian unification, and increase the chances of reaching an agreement.

The focus on the settlement issue prevents pressing problems, such as the Fatah-Hamas divide, from being addressed. Some Arab commentators have criticized the negotiations for being largely dependent on the settlement issue. Abdel Rahman al-Rasheed wrote in the Arab daily, *al-Sharq al-Aswat*, that Abbas “was wrong when he downgraded the demands of the Palestinian people to simply stopping settlement building (which has become his greatest ambition)... There are only two parties happy with what he’s achieved: extremist Israelis and Hamas, which want to sabotage anything in which it doesn’t play a part.”

It is impossible to solve a convoluted issue simply by addressing one of its elements. Likewise, an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians will not be reached nor will the conflict be ended, simply by laying the settlement issue to rest. It is important to look at all of the issues that inhibit a peaceful resolution and work toward achieving an agreement that is representative of all those parties affected. An Israeli-Palestinian peace cannot be possible if it excludes a huge part of the affected population. As the window for brokering an agreement becomes increasingly smaller, the gridlock over the settlement issue threatens the possibility of achieving a real peace. Netanyahu and Abbas must examine all issues which are currently inhibiting peace and agree to a concrete, trust-building plan that includes a phased Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and an end to the siege on Gaza in return for a united Palestinian renunciation of violence and of territorial claims to Israel proper once final borders have been drawn.

The Influence of Constituency Opinion on Congressional Voting

A Case Study of the Armenian Diaspora and Section 907

— *Nader Delavari*

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes (1963) wrote their influential article “Constituency Influence in Congress” scholars have tried to answer the question of how democratic is Congress. Miller and Stokes found that the vote of representatives matches constituency opinion fairly well on some issues and quite poorly on others.ⁱ Specifically, they found that constituency opinion has very little influence on representative voting behavior on matters of foreign policy. Conversely, they found that the representative vote reflects constituency opinion fairly well on civil rights issues. Scholars have sought to find explanations for the variation in constituency influence on representative voting. One prevailing argument has been that citizens do not care as much about foreign policy as they do about civil rights. Therefore, representatives consider the opinions of their constituents more heavily when those opinions are deeply held. The study of diaspora communities offers an interesting contribution to this debate. Diaspora communities generally feel very strongly about foreign policy questions pertaining to their ancestral home. Thus, it is expected that representatives would

consider the opinion of diaspora constituents more than the average citizen on foreign policy issues that affect the historical home of the diaspora. A case study of the Armenian Diaspora and its efforts to support a pro-Armenian amendment in the 1992 Freedom Support Act offers a chance to test this hypothesis.

THEORY

In 1992, Congress passed an amendment to the Freedom Support Act which has come to be known as Section 907. The amendment banned American foreign assistance to Azerbaijan until it takes “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh”.ⁱⁱ The amendment was passed with broad support, requiring only a voice vote. At the time, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh had been escalating. The Karabagh Cause was extremely dear to the Armenian Diaspora. Depriving Azerbaijan of U.S. foreign assistance while awarding Armenia with a relatively large foreign aid package was considered a victory by the Diaspora community. The amendment sent a signal to Azerbaijan that the U.S. Congress recognized Azerbaijan as the aggressor in the

conflict and thus was going to exclude it from the massive aid promised to post-Soviet states. In their chapter “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caspian”, David King and Miles Pomper (2005) propose that the Armenian Diaspora has been particularly effective in influencing Congress to pass pro-Armenian legislation because of the concentration of the Diaspora in a few major cities.ⁱⁱⁱ Because the Diaspora is concentrated in several congressional districts, it can have a large impact on the voting behavior of a few congressmen. If the Armenian American population had been evenly distributed throughout the United States, the number of Armenians in each congressional district would be negligible.

METHODOLOGY

This study will model the relationship between the Armenian population in a congressional district and the voting behavior of the representative of that district. The model uses a logistic function instead of a linear function (see Figure 1). The model implies that the addition of an extra Armenian American has the least impact on congressional voting at very low and very high levels of Armenian population in a congressional district. Conversely, the impact of an extra

Armenian American is expected to be high when there is a moderate number of Armenian Americans in a congressional district. A linear model would imply that the addition of an Armenian American to a congressional district would have the same effect regardless of the number of Armenian Americans existing in the congressional district. The logistic model better matches the literature that suggests that the success of Armenian Americans in influencing Congress is partly due to their concentration in a few congressional districts. Further, the raw population of Armenian Americans in a congressional district is used instead of the proportion of the congressional district that is Armenian American. Congressional districts tend to be of similar size with only a few cases of very large districts, such as the Montana At-large congressional district.

It is very difficult, and in most cases impossible, to match support for Section 907 to congressman because the amendment was passed by a voice vote. However, there was a vote on the House floor in 1998 to repeal an amendment that would repeal Section 907. The Armenian Diaspora continued to support Section 907 after the amendment was passed in 1992. Since 1992, Azerbaijan focused its efforts on repealing the legislation. In 1994 Haydar Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, signed “The Deal of the Century”, a contract between the government of Azerbaijan and a consortium of oil companies interested in exploiting Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas fields. The deal strengthened Azerbaijan’s economic ties with the U.S., as several of the oil companies were American. Amoco held the greatest share of the deal among the American companies. Aliyev expected that American oil companies would lobby on Azerbaijan’s behalf. The 1998 amendment


to repeal Section 907 was the culmination of Azerbaijan’s lobbying efforts. Republican Representative John Edward Porter of Illinois’s 10th Congressional District sponsored the amendment that “deletes language that would have repealed section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act which prohibits direct U.S. government aid to Azerbaijan”.^{iv} Representative Porter’s amendment passed in a 231 to 182 vote with 21 members not voting. A majority of Congress voted for the amendment that supported Section 907. This roll call vote can be used as a measure of a representative’s support for Section 907. The vote is coded as a dichotomous variable (a 1 indicates support for Section 907 and a 0 indicates opposition for Section 907).^v The logistic function will give the probability of a congressman supporting Section 907 given the population of Armenians in his congressional district.

Aside from the independent variable of interest (the population of Armenian Americans in a congressional district), two control

variables are included in the model. The first is a dichotomous variable measuring the party identification of the representative (a 1 indicates a Democrat and a 0 indicates a Republican). The second control variable is a measure of the amount of money a representative received from the Amoco Corporation Political Action Committee (PAC). It is hypothesized that the representatives that received campaign donations from Amoco are more likely to oppose Section 907. Campaign donations from Amoco’s PAC are dwarfed by spending on lobbyists. However, it is not possible to clearly quantify how much a representative was lobbied. In contrast, PAC donations are quantifiable and public information. The variable controlling for Amoco’s PAC contributions are measured in dollars. The PAC contributions may also serve as a proxy for lobbying efforts because the PAC is most likely to donate to representatives who have also been lobbied by Amoco lobbyists.

The resulting model is as follows:
 $P(Y) = (1 + e^{-(B1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + B4X4)})^{-1}$

FIGURE 1



- B_1 is a constant.
- X_2 is the number of Armenian Americans in the representative's district.
- X_3 is the party identification of the representative.
- X_4 is the amount of money donated to the representative's campaign by Amoco Corp. PAC.
- B_2, B_3, B_4 are the coefficients of X_2, X_3, X_4 .

DATA

The roll call vote of the representatives was retrieved from the Congressional Record.^{vi} The amount of money donated by Amoco to the representatives' campaigns in the 1998 Congressional elections is public information and was retrieved from the website Open Secrets.^{vii} The data used for the population of Armenians in a congressional district is from the 2000 U.S. Census. The roll call vote used in this analysis is from the 105th Congress. However, the population of Armenians recorded in the 2000 Census applies to the 106th Congress. Although redistricting may introduce imprecision into the model, the 1990 Census is not a better alternative.

RESULTS

All three variables are statistically and substantively significant. The model with the estimated coefficients is as follows:

$$P(Y) = (1 + e^{(-.653 + .00114 \cdot X_2 + 1.21 \cdot X_3 - .000770 \cdot X_4)})^{-1}$$

While at first it may seem the coefficient of the Armenian population variable is low (at .00114), one must remember the units. The units used for the Armenian population variable is persons. Obviously the effect of the addition of a single Armenian to a congressional district should be small. It is helpful to consider the addition of a larger number of Armenians to a congressional district. For instance, if there are 1000 more Armenians in a congressional district, the representative is 75.76% more likely to support Section 907.

	VOTE
Armenian Population	0.00114*** (4.60)
Party ID	1.215*** (5.37)
Amoco PAC	-0.000770** (-2.64)
cons	-0.653** (-3.21)
<i>N</i>	414

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.01$

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results from this analysis support the notion that constituencies can have a very large influence on foreign policy. Miller and Stokes noted, "Especially critical is the question whether different models of representation apply to different public issues" (Miller and Stokes p. 46). The findings from this study suggest that the representatives can be quite responsive to constituency preferences on matters of foreign policy. Perhaps the more critical question is whether different models of representation apply to different constituencies. Certainly some constituencies are more politically active, cohesive, organized, and thus influential, than others. An interesting question raised by this analysis is: why has the Armenian Diaspora been so effective in influencing congressional

representatives?

Heather Gregg (2002) has begun to answer this question in her insightful study, "Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States."^{viii} Gregg argues that the competition between the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) has made both lobbies more effective in supporting Armenian interests. Although these two ethnic lobbies have been quite powerful, their influence on congressional voting must not be overstated. Without the votes and donations of the Armenian Diaspora, the lobbies would be powerless. The lobbies are simply a mechanism through which the Diaspora influences Congress.

ⁱ Miller, Warren E., Donald E. Stokes. "Constituency Influence in Congress". *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 57, Issue 1 (Mar., 1963), 45-56.

ⁱⁱ U.S. Public Law 102-511.

ⁱⁱⁱ David C. King, Miles Pomper. "Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caspian," in Brenda Shaffer, ed., *The Limits of Culture: Islam, and Foreign*. Cambridge: MIT University Press, 2005.

^{iv} "Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999: H.AMDT.902 (A003)". *Congressional Record*. < <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HZ00902:>>.

^v Not-voting members are excluded from the analysis.

^{vi} "Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999: Roll Vote No. 447." *Congressional Record*, H.R.4569, September 17, 1998. <<http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll447.xml>>.

^{vii} OpenSecrets.org: Amoco Corp Contributions to Federal Candidates, <<http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot.php?cmte=C00060103&cycle=1998>>.

^{viii} Heather Gregg. "Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States". Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/13_divided.pdf>.

MJIA STAFF

EDITORIAL BOARD

Hannah Jun

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Nader Delavari and Tom Pavone

MANAGING EDITORS

Nicholas Moenck

DIRECTOR OF FINANCE

Elan Cohen

SECRETARY

Justin Schon

DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

STAFF WRITERS

AMERICAS

Tamara Andrade, *EDITOR*

Seth Soderborg, Ebrahim Varachia, David Kozminski, Jake Gatof

AFRICA

Tyler Jones, *EDITOR*

Brienne Prusak, Julia Jacovides, Malcolm Scott,
Elizabeth Deschaine, Bala Naveen Kakaraparthi, Andie Shafer

ASIA

Cece Zhou, *EDITOR*

Xin Yi Lim, Slyvia Tan, Zain Khan, Arthur Ng, Saahil Karpe

EUROPE

John Schoettle, *EDITOR*

Michael Pienta, Caitlin Miller, Kevin Mersol-Barg, Jeremy Armand

MIDDLE EAST

George Nakhleh, *EDITOR*

Sam Spiegelman, Aditi Shetty, John White, Madeleine Levey-Lambert,
Rohit Vyas, Rich Zukowsky, Michael McHenry

